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Legal Origins and Evolution of Local Ethics Reform in New Orleans
David A. Marcello

The Office of Inspector General came first, and like many another reform in city government, it was
born as a campaign commitment. When I met with state senator Marc H. Morial in September 1993
to discuss the issues component of his campaign for mayor, ideas poured out of him for an hour and
a half, and I took copious notes. “We need an Inspector General,” he said, “and we need Charter
Revision”—the two ideas linked from this first campaign convening. When he was elected mayor
six months later and inaugurated in May 1994, charter reform became an early and important item
of business in his new administration.1
This article focuses in Part 1 on the 1994–1995 charter revision process that was the initial
vehicle for local ethics reform. Part 2 examines the stuttering, stop-and-go history of implementation
after the successful charter revision process—a period during which enactment of formal legal
instruments was followed by halting implementation steps, accompanied throughout by the need for
further legal instruments to reform and restructure ethics entities. Part 3 draws some considered
conclusions, taking a long perspective on the evolution of local ethics reforms.

Part 1. Home Rule Charter Revision: 1994–1995
Mayor Morial made charter revision a centerpiece of his August 1994 State of the City address: “In
the second of our centerpieces, I will by executive order reinvigorate the city charter process. . . .
Other efforts to revise the charter have failed. We will not fail this time.”2 A year after our September
1993 campaign meeting, I was back in a meeting with Marc Morial—this time, as the mayor—again
taking notes as he shared his vision of needed Home Rule Charter reforms. He promptly followed
through by naming a Charter Revision Advisory Committee in October 1994 and appointed me as
its chair.3
History of Home Rule Charter Reform in New Orleans
The city’s home rule authority derives from the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 as continued in force
by the 1974 Constitution.4 The city’s first Home Rule Charter, written and adopted during the
administration of Mayor de Lesseps S. “Chep” Morrison, took effect on January 1, 1954, and
continued in operation with very few amendments for more than four decades after its adoption.
Each of Marc Morial’s three predecessors as mayor attempted charter revision, and each attempt
failed.5 Mayor Moon Landrieu appointed a charter committee in 1975, but its proposed revisions
never reached the ballot.6 Mayor Ernest N. “Dutch” Morial (Marc Morial’s father) attempted twice
to amend the charter in order to extend the mayor’s term in office beyond the two-term limit; his
proposals were twice rejected by the voters.7 Mayor Sidney Barthelemy appointed a charter
committee in 1991; its report went to the voters on October 16, 1993 (within the last year of his
term), as four separate ballot propositions, each of which the voters rejected.8
David A. Marcello crafted the original Home Rule Charter amendments that led to the establishment of the Ethics Review
Board and the Office of Inspector General. He currently serves as executive director of The Public Law Center, which
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These earlier charter revision efforts failed for various reasons. All of the previous mayors who fell
short left charter revision until late in their terms. Some of these charter revision efforts dragged out
over several years. In addition, some charter initiatives acquired suspect “political” overtones. And
in one instance, dividing the charter into multiple propositions likely contributed to voter confusion
and dissatisfaction.
Marc Morial sought to avoid many of these problems in his charter revision effort. He appointed
the Charter Revision Advisory Committee within six months after his inauguration as mayor and
charged the committee to accomplish its work within a very tight timetable, setting a deadline of
December 15 for the committee’s draft of proposed charter revisions. He asked the committee to
avoid some “hot button” issues that voters might perceive as politically controversial (e.g., advising
the committee “not to tamper with the basic framework of the mayor-council form of government
that was instituted in 1954 or with the two-term limits on the mayor or City Council members”).9
And significantly, the committee presented its recommendations as a single set of proposed
revisions, not fragmented among several different subject areas.
The Morial charter revision process benefited from the work of civic and business organizations
that had identified their own priorities for charter reform, including the League of Women Voters of
New Orleans and the New Orleans Business Council.10 These earlier charter revision proposals all
sounded the same theme: a need for greater flexibility in government.11 The problem resided in the
1954 Home Rule Charter’s inflexible enumeration of executive branch offices, departments, boards,
and commissions.12 Any modification of this organizational structure could be accomplished only
through voter approval in a citywide election.13 Because the 1954 charter made it difficult to
reorganize or consolidate existing city agencies or to establish any new city agencies, many functions
that were not part of city government in the 1950s (e.g., transit administration, minority business
development, environmental affairs) were created as “divisions” within the Mayor’s Office—an
inadequate patchwork of ad hoc responses to rapidly changing political circumstances during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
Overview of Charter Revision Advisory Committee Meetings
The Charter Revision Advisory Committee that convened at Gallier Hall in October 1994 was far
different from the 1951 charter committee that produced the 1954 Home Rule Charter. The Morial
committee was larger, consisting of thirty-eight members as contrasted with twelve on the 1951
committee. The Morial committee also exhibited greater gender and racial diversity14; the 1951
committee was all white and had only one female member.15
In his charge to the committee, Mayor Morial identified several aspects of the current Home
Rule Charter that he thought should be left unchanged, including the basic mayor-council form of
government, the two-term limit for mayor and council members, the prohibition on road-use or realproperty service charges without a vote of the people, and the “one casino” provision. He also
identified several innovations and charter reforms that he hoped the committee would consider,
singling out the inspector general as one of his campaign pledges. Like earlier mayors and students
of charter revision, he emphasized the need for greater flexibility in reorganizing city government.
He called upon the committee to include a bill of rights in the Home Rule Charter.16 Mayor Morial
also directed the committee to conduct its business in compliance with the open meetings17 and
public records18 laws.
Charter revision took place in three significant phases. In Phase I, the committee reviewed and
suggested proposed revisions to the 1954 Home Rule Charter, beginning at meetings in October
1994 and concluding with its delivery of proposed revisions to the mayor and the members of the
2
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city council on December 15, 1994.19 Phase II consisted of elected officials’ review and revision of
the proposed charter amendments, beginning with the December 15 delivery of “Committee
Recommendations” to the mayor and city council and ending at the August 17, 1995 council meeting
that approved an ordinance placing proposed charter amendments on the ballot for a citywide
election. The Phase III public information campaign launched even before Phase II ended, and its
effectiveness was demonstrated when voters overwhelmingly approved the charter revision by a 68
percent to 32 percent margin of victory on November 18, 1995.20
Public information and citizen participation characterized every phase of the charter revision
process. The committee conducted its meetings and subcommittee meetings in public, pursuant to
Louisiana’s Open Meetings Act, and treated all charter revision documents as public documents in
accordance with Louisiana’s Public Records Act. In every phase of the process, we solicited public
input and shared information with the public through forums, newspaper articles, and public
television and radio broadcasts. Before delivering its December 15 “Committee Recommendations”
to Mayor Morial, the committee advertised and conducted two public hearings in the City Council
Chamber (one on the evening of December 13, the other in the afternoon on December 14).21
Throughout Phase I of the process, we met with members of the New Orleans City Council to solicit
their views and suggestions for revision. Consequently, council members, the press, the public, and
numerous civic sector organizations were already familiar with the direction of charter reform before
the “Committee Recommendations” were delivered to Mayor Morial.22
Charter Provisions Proposing an Office of Inspector General
The first substantial task was to divide this diverse group of committee members into appropriate
subcommittees to review assigned portions of the charter and suggest revisions. Each member of the
committee served on one of six subcommittees, with a designated chair and vice chair.
The Regulatory and Licensing Functions/Ethics Subcommittee was chaired by Gary Groesch.23
His views were shaped by his daily working responsibilities as director of the Alliance for Affordable
Energy, which monitored utility proceedings before the New Orleans City Council and championed
the interests of consumers and ratepayers.24 Gary Groesch was acutely aware of the potential for
ethical conflicts within city government; as an outside observer and sometime critic of city
government, he was also keenly protective of transparency and public participation. These attributes
qualified him to chair the subcommittee that was charged with ethics and regulatory reform.
The subcommittee produced an entirely new chapter 4 in article IX (“General Provisions”) of
the Home Rule Charter entitled “Office of Inspector General; Ethics,” which detailed the
establishment of an “Office of Inspector General”; its “Purpose and Authority” and “Powers”; the
“Selection, Term and Removal of the Inspector General”; a “Prohibition against Political Activities”;
and a veto-proof “Budget” procedure.25
Embedded within these six new provisions were far-reaching powers of investigation26 that the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) could deploy at its own initiative or in response to complaints,
including confidential complaints27; a guarantee of “complete access, to the fullest extent permitted
by law, to all city records and public records and documents, including employee personnel records”
(sec. 9-401[1]); the power to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of documents (sec. 9403[2]); protection for investigations and documents to remain “confidential to the fullest extent
permitted by law” (sec. 9-403[4]); authority to “recommend that appropriate corrective action be
taken against the person who is the subject of the investigation or that departmental policy or
procedure be modified to prevent subsequent acts of misconduct or mismanagement” (sec. 9403[6]); and the discretion to refer possible violations of federal, state, or municipal law to the United
3
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States attorney, the district attorney, or the city attorney (sec. 9-403[7]). The “Committee
Recommendations” sought to establish without delay a vigorous OIG that would minimize politics
in appointing the inspector general (sec. 9-404), insulate the office from political involvement (sec.
9-405), and insure “adequate annual appropriations” for its proper operation (sec. 9-406). These
same provisions to establish a vigorous and nonpolitical OIG remained intact in the “Mayor’s
Recommendations” released three months later.28 On its way to the ballot, however, our powerful
747 of an ethics engine flew through a political time warp and emerged as the equivalent of a Piper
Cub.
Councilmember-at-Large Jim Singleton led the council’s negotiations with Mayor Morial,
requesting and receiving numerous changes in the evolving text. One of the most consequential
eliminated two and a half pages of detailed provisions establishing a powerful OIG in the charter
and substituted a single discretionary sentence: “The Council may by ordinance create an Office of
Inspector General and otherwise provide with respect thereto.”29 More than a decade elapsed before
a different city council finally acted on this discretionary power, establishing the OIG by ordinance
in 2006.30 Two years more elapsed before the OIG and other local ethics bodies secured Home Rule
Charter protection and a dedicated source of funding in a 2008 ballot proposition.31 The six detailed
sections that were deleted would have immediately established the OIG in the revised charter on its
January 1, 1996 effective date.
Another city council suggestion delayed and complicated implementation of an important ethics
reform—procurement of professional services.
Professional Services Procurement Reform
New Orleans’ 1954 Home Rule Charter required public bidding of all procurements except for
“unique or noncompetitive articles” and “professional services.”32 Exempting unique or
noncompetitive articles from bidding is unavoidable; they are effectively “sole source” procurements
for which no realistic prospect of competition exists. The rationale for exempting professional
services, however, is different: Professional services can—and should—be “competitively selected”
(rather than “bid”), so that contracts can be awarded based on considerations such as experience and
competence, rather than who submitted the lowest price.
Public bids typically go to the “lowest responsible bidder”—the respondent who satisfies all bid
requirements and submits the lowest price. Bids work well when purchasing standard goods—for
example, Number 2 pencils: Simply open the envelopes submitted by all responsive bidders and
award the contract to whichever one offered the lowest per-unit price.
But a bid process is poorly suited to awarding contracts for professional services. If a public
body wants its building to stay up, they may not be well served by hiring an engineer who offers the
lowest price for engineering services. “Competitive selection” preserves an incentive for respondents
to lower their prices, but it also preserves the discretion for public officials to award contracts based
on a subjective evaluation of each respondent's capabilities—not simply who submitted the lowest
price.
The 1954 charter appropriately exempted professional services contracts from “bidding” but fell
short by not requiring an alternative “competitive selection” process for professional services.
Leaving this important decision to the unfettered discretion of public officials meant that
professional services contracts could (and inevitably would) be used for patronage purposes. Public
officials could exploit their discretion by awarding contracts to contributors, political supporters, and
even to family members without fear of contradiction or complaint under the terms of the 1954 Home
Rule Charter.
4
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The “Committee Recommendations” proposed for the first time that, “Contracts for professional
services shall be awarded on the basis of a competitive selection process as established by ordinance”
(emphasis added).33 During the first months of 1995, Councilmember Singleton and Mayor Morial
discussed and ultimately agreed that the two branches of city government should set their own
separate procurement processes—by council rule for the legislative branch and by mayoral executive
order for the executive branch. Mayor Morial adopted this change in his proposed revision of Section
6-308(5):
Contracts for professional services administered by the offices, departments, boards and
other agencies of the Executive Branch shall be awarded on the basis of a competitive
selection process which shall be established by executive order of the Mayor. Contracts for
professional services administered by the Council shall be awarded on the basis of a
competitive selection process which shall be established by rule of the Council. Each such
order or rule and any amendment thereto shall be published once in the official journal and
shall be the subject of a public hearing at least seven days prior to its effective date.
(Emphasis added)34
The city council made a few more changes before approving a ballot proposition at its August 17,
1995 meeting.35
Commission members hoped that Mayor Morial would set rigorous competitive selection
procedures for the executive branch and that public scrutiny would exert pressure on the council to
“ratchet up” its own procedures to meet this high standard. What ensued instead more resembled a
race to the bottom—a story of implementation that we’ll consider in Part 2.
Elected Officials’ Consideration of Charter Revision
The mayor distributed the December 15 “Committee Recommendations” to all department heads
and the chief administrative officer and to many boards and commissions, requesting their review
and comments during January 1995. In February, Mayor Morial met with the Charter Revision
Advisory Committee to discuss changes he would make to the “Committee Recommendations”
based on their feedback; his changes were later embodied in a new March 15, 1995 draft of “Mayor’s
Recommendations,” which was delivered to all members of the city council and placed in each
branch of the New Orleans Public Library system.
Mayor Morial asked the city council to conclude its consideration of his proposed charter
revisions by early April so that charter reform could be included on a July 1995 citywide election
ballot. When some council members repeatedly expressed reservations about this timetable, Mayor
Morial postponed the target date to allow more time for council review.36 Running on a parallel track
in Baton Rouge, the Morial administration continued its efforts to secure amendments in state law
that would be needed to implement some proposed charter changes.37
We used this window of opportunity to address concerns raised by civic groups during the
comment period. The Bureau of Governmental Research (BGR) identified thirteen areas of concern,
which were discussed and resolved in multiple meetings with BGR executive director Jim Brandt
and other representatives of the organization. The commission also benefited greatly from detailed
review and comment by the only surviving member of the 1951 charter committee, Moise Dennery,
who met several times with Jon Eckert, director of the Mayor’s Office of Policy Planning. They
suggested more than a hundred changes, ranging from typographical errors to substantive
improvements. By the time charter revision returned to the city council’s agenda in early August, we
had an improved document and BGR’s support for the package of proposed revisions.
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Significant negotiations took place during early August between city council staff and charter
committee representatives. We received from council members more than a hundred proposed
amendments and agreed to present a package of seventy amendments at the crucial August 17
council meeting. The amendments divided into three categories: Morial administration amendments,
council amendments acceptable to the Morial administration, and council amendments to which the
Morial administration was opposed.
Some of Mayor Morial’s separate negotiations with members of the city council led to modest
changes but still preserved important reforms—creating new flexibility in the charter, for example,
after altering the proposed council review process: Rather than requiring a supermajority vote (5 out
of 7) to reject a mayor’s proposed restructuring of city government, the council would vote to
approve it by a simple majority.38 The OIG, however, elicited far more contentious pushback from
the council and its two at-large members: “Jim Singleton and Peggy Wilson are among the Council
members who have said they oppose creating such a position.”39
Significant changes arose out of last-minute negotiations between the mayor and members of
the city council on August 16, 1996—the day before the council would decide whether to put charter
revision on the ballot. Most significant was a proposed “amendment by Jim Singleton and Peggy
Wilson to eliminate the Office of Inspector General, which would have broad power to investigate
elected officials and city workers in an effort to root out corruption. Morial has strongly endorsed
the concept.”40 The council prevailed: Their 7–0 vote replaced multiple pages of robust OIG powers
with a single sentence that made creation of an OIG discretionary with the council and delayed
implementation of this important ethics reform for more than a decade. It could have been worse:
“Wilson proposed eliminating the inspector general and review board altogether but lost 6–1.”41
Additional damaging changes were proposed—some successfully, some not, and others fell in
between. A Singleton amendment “to drop language requiring the council to approve money for the
review board passed 7–0,” surely contributing to the ERB’s moribund status during the next twelve
years. Councilmember Suzanne Haik Terrell proposed an amendment “to leave to the Council the
decision on whether to establish a Revenue Estimating Conference,” which would likely have
consigned this worthy fiscal reform to the same limbo that ultimately afflicted the OIG and ERB.
Her amendment first passed 6–0, then failed 3–3 on a reconsideration vote. She did succeed in
weakening the reform, when she and Singleton “offered an amendment to make the conference’s
revenue forecast only a recommendation for spending levels, not a binding limit. It passed 7–0.”
Wilson and Terrell struck another blow for the status quo when they proposed “to let members of
the Board of Liquidation, City Debt, keep their current unlimited terms” rather than setting staggered
twelve-year terms; they lost by a 5–2 vote.42
Ultimately, the council unanimously voted the proposed charter revisions onto a November 18,
1995 citywide election ballot. In the aftermath, reactions were mixed. Mayor Morial said, “It’s better
than not having (them) at all. It’s not what we preferred.” Jim Brandt said that the “overall document
reflects most of the major proposals that BGR has supported.” The charter committee breathed a
sigh of relief that “voters will be asked to approve the hundreds of changes as one proposition.”43
Securing Voter Approval of Charter Revision
The entire Charter Revision Advisory Committee reconvened on October 12, 1995, to receive copies
of the “Proposed Amendments” as finally approved by the council. Thereafter, committee members
made many presentations to civic and community organizations as part of the Phase III public
information campaign. Broad civic sector support coalesced as the November 18 election date
neared: “The Bureau of Governmental Research, the Metropolitan Area Committee, the New
6
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Orleans Council of the Chamber of Commerce, and Victims and Citizens Against Crime have all
endorsed the package of revisions. The League of Women Voters, which has worked for many years
to revise the charter, also supports the effort.”44
Ethics played a leading role in soliciting public support for every version of the proposed charter
changes. The December 15, 1994 “Committee Recommendations” and the March 15, 1995
“Mayor’s Recommendations” both began with a “Highlights” page that put front and center two
proposed new local ethics entities:
For the first time, an Office of the Inspector General is created pursuant to Charter mandate
(pp. 155–57) and charged with the responsibility for investigating misconduct and
mismanagement as it impacts city government.
Finally, an Ethics Code and Ethics Review Board are established by Charter mandate
(pp. 157–158) to restore public confidence in the ethical conduct of city affairs. (Emphasis
in original)
The August 18, 1995 “Proposed Amendments to the Charter” (widely distributed to press and public
in the run-up to a November 18 charter election) placed “Ethics” first in its list of “Charter
Amendment Highlights” and expanded the list of ethics-related reforms in the legislative and
executive branches:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

prohibiting a person appointed to fill a vacant council seat from running for the seat at the next
election, thereby preventing “insider” appointees from having an unfair advantage (sec. 3105[2]);
providing for removal from office of a council member (sec. 3-106) or mayor (sec. 4-205)
convicted of a felony or recalled by the voters;
extending the city council’s power to conduct investigations to any entity funded in full or in part
by city revenues (sec. 3-124[1]);
preserving the right to vote for a council member serving as acting mayor (sec. 4-204[3]);
requiring the functions of a city notary to be performed in-house by salaried personnel of the
Law Department rather than by outside counsel, thereby ending a costly patronage practice (sec.
4-404);
requiring for the first time that city contracts for professional services be awarded only after a
competitive selection procedure (sec. 6-308[5]); and
retaining the charter restriction that permitted only one land-based gambling casino (sec. 9-310).

The “Ethics” highlights concluded with two familiar paragraphs championing the OIG and ERB and
directing the city council to strengthen the city’s ethics code:
Section 9-401 authorizes the City Council to establish by ordinance an Office of Inspector
General.
Section 9-402 requires the City Council to establish by ordinance an Ethics Review
Board, whose members will be nominated by the university presidents and appointed by the
mayor subject to approval of the city council. Section 9-402 also requires the City Council
to establish by ordinance a city code of ethics incorporating the ethical standards of the State
Code of Ethics and whatever additional requirements the council may deem appropriate.
The charter highlights leave little doubt that city leaders and Charter Revision Advisory Committee
members identified ethics reform as one of the strongest, most appealing themes for the public
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information campaign. These ethics reform initiatives helped ignite overwhelming support among
voters for the entire array of charter amendments.
The Home Rule Charter revision process officially ended on November 18, 1995, when voters
approved the proposed amendments. A January 1, 1996 effective date left less than two months to
prepare for implementation of numerous new charter reforms.

Part 2. Implementation of Ethics Reforms
New Orleans might never have seen the implementation of local ethics reforms but for the
devastating damage inflicted by Hurricane Katrina:
Ten years after New Orleans’ 1994–95 home rule charter revision process, the city still had
no ethics review board, no office of inspector general, and no reform in procurement of
professional services. Ten years of no progress—and no progress in sight—provides us with
a good test case. We must credit Katrina as the catalyst that led to implementation of the
ERB, OIG, and professional services procurement reform in post-Katrina New Orleans.45
This pattern of first approving charter reform legal instruments, then encountering long delays and
shortfalls in implementation unfortunately characterized ethics reform throughout subsequent
decades.
Complications in Implementing Competitive Selection Procedures
The original charter revision timetable contemplated that proposed revisions would be approved by
public officials during the first quarter of 1995, followed by public hearings and widespread citizen
review in the second quarter, then seeking voter approval in mid-July.46 This original timetable
allowed about six months for planning and implementation before the revised charter’s January 1,
1996 effective date. An extended period of review by the city council, however, delayed the election
to November and left less than two months to prepare for the newly revised charter’s implementation.
Complicating matters, City Hall’s attention was diverted (in fact, consumed) soon after voters
approved the charter changes, when Harrah’s Casino laid off twenty-five hundred casino employees
and idled a thousand construction workers shortly before Thanksgiving.47 Harrah’s had just
succeeded in cutting its $100 million annual payment to the state to $50 million, securing this 50
percent reduction with enthusiastic support from city officials and the local workforce, who all touted
the casino’s beneficial effects on employment in New Orleans.48 City officials considered the
casino’s draconian dismissals of its employees an egregious breach of faith and directed every effort
during the remainder of 1995 toward securing an enforceable commitment against Harrah’s that
would protect the workforce. Charter implementation fell off City Hall’s radar screen.
During the second week of January 1996, implementation of the new charter provisions roared
back onto City Hall’s radar screen with a vengeance. When the city council attempted a “routine”
renewal of its utility consultants’ contracts, Gary Groesch and the Alliance for Affordable Energy
pointed out that effective January 1, 1996, the council could no longer award utility consultant
contracts with the same unfettered discretion as in the past.49 The charter now required that such
contracts be advertised and awarded through competitive selection procedures set by a council rule
not yet promulgated.50 When the city council persisted in efforts to renew the contracts, the Alliance
sued to enjoin them until they complied with the new competitive selection requirements.51
It’s often said, “Hard cases make bad law.” When the Alliance launched its litigation, utility
consultants had been working since the start of the new year without a current contract; by the time
this lawsuit worked its way through the appellate courts, judges were unlikely to throw out the
8
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consultants unceremoniously with no compensation for their months of labor. The Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld a “grandfathering” provision written into Council Rule 45 that included the
power to approve “Any contracts in existence prior to January 1, 1996 for: a) Renewal or extension
of the contract, when continuity of service is essential.”52
Hard cases make bad rules, too. The city council—already badly burned by the new competitive
selection requirements—was determined to avoid being hamstrung in the future. Council Rule 45
(“Competitive Selection Process for Professional Services Contracts”) was adopted in the midst of
this controversy and was drafted permissively to maintain council control over the awards process;
more than twenty years later, press coverage of the council’s utility regulatory contracts still
identified problems that could be traced back to this early, troubled council implementation effort.53
The council’s proposed procedure elicited a vehement denunciation from Gary Groesch, who
called the plan “a stab in the back of the voters in this city” and said that the council’s self-serving
use of its own staff to rank candidates was “a weakening of an already pathetically weak process.”54
A Times-Picayune editorial called the council’s action “a disappointing reversion to old politics as
usual.”55 Still today, paragraph 8 in (now renumbered) Rule 42 establishes selection review
committees consisting of the council chief of staff, council research officer, and either the council
fiscal officer or the chief of staff of council utilities, depending upon the type of professional service
solicited.56 All three of these members are salaried employees of the council and likely to be
responsive to the council’s wishes.
After a BGR status report entitled “Implementation of Amendments to New Orleans City
Charter” in September 1996 identified “competitive selection procedures for professional services
contracts” as one of several substantive changes awaiting implementation,57 Mayor Morial issued a
September 5, 1996 executive order fixing competitive selection procedures for all executive branch
entities.
MHM 96-020 displayed the same shortcomings as the council rule in terms of in-house control:
Selection review rating groups were to “supervise the entire selection process” and would
purportedly “conduct an independent, objective evaluation of applicants.”58 But the selection review
rating groups59 and the grants provider selection review rating groups60 were drawn from the
unclassified service; all members of these evaluation groups held their employment at the pleasure
of the mayor, who could undermine their independence at any moment. Theoretically, the chief
administrative officer or an executive assistant could appoint to the rating groups “other persons with
specialized knowledge or expertise” from the community at large or the university community; but
these “outsiders” would be chosen by mayoral representatives—if chosen at all, since the executive
order also provided, “Nothing herein shall be construed to require these additional raters.”61
When evaluation groups consist entirely of surrogates for the mayor or council, the professional
services procurement process remains rich terrain for patronage politics: “Any contracting process
in which elected officials or their appointees participate can be circumvented or manipulated for
political purposes.”62 A better solution, as I have pointed out elsewhere, would be to “let independent
entities with specialized expertise designate evaluation committee members, thereby promoting
politically independent evaluations” and producing evaluation committees that are “technically
competent, politically independent and demographically diverse.” And I added, “We can accomplish
all three of these objectives.”63
Mayor Morial’s successor demonstrated how the failure to implement procurement reforms not
only harms the public but also exposes public officials to temptation and the risk of severe penalties.
As a candidate, C. Ray Nagin promised in his 2002 mayoral campaign to submit a ballot
proposition to the city council within one hundred days after his inauguration, inviting voters to unite
9
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the separate legislative and executive branch procurement policies into a single procedure fixed by
ordinance.64 He committed to this proposition in one of our earliest meetings about campaign issues,
and he reiterated the hundred-day promise publicly many times thereafter.65 But Mayor Nagin
reneged on this commitment, as he frankly acknowledged in October 2002: “Times-Picayune
reporter Frank Donze caught up with the mayor and asked him about the busted 100-day deadline
for a ballot proposition. Yep, the mayor agreed, he’d missed it, and he wasn’t going to give a new
deadline because he didn’t want to disappoint everyone again.”66
At a meeting in the Mayor’s Office two months before his public acknowledgment, I witnessed
how this about-face on policy began:
I attended an executive staff meeting in August 2002, less than100 days after Ray Nagin was
inaugurated. I’d been invited there to present a proposal for reform in the procurement of
professional services.
After my presentation, around the table they went, complaining that these “burdensome
new procedures” would be “inefficient,” would “tie our hands,” would prevent the mayor’s
brash and talented new staff from hiring “the best and the brightest.”
And Ray Nagin bought those arguments. “Procurement reform” remained for the rest of
his administration merely a matter of “spin,” as illusory as those “cranes in the sky.”67
The one-hundred-day commitment was still within Nagin’s grasp during this August 2002
executive staff meeting, and he was still making hollow promises of progress to the public:
Although he pledged during his campaign to offer a plan for reforming the way the city
awards lucrative professional services contracts within 90 days, Nagin said it likely will be
another 90 days before a proposal is ready. He said a draft ordinance is being reviewed by
“key stakeholders” such as the Bureau of Governmental Research and a coalition of minority
contractors.68
Not even ninety days later, this campaign commitment was gone for good, with unforeseen
consequences yet to be felt within his administration.
Nagin’s first executive order dealt with professional services procurement; it was not a
promising start. CRN 02-01 added new jobs to the list of professional services, thereby enhancing
mayoral discretion in awarding lucrative contracts.69 Several of the new job listings were merely
arbitrary (e.g., the change from “physicians” to “doctors” and from “attorneys” to “lawyers”) or
inconsequential (e.g., the addition of “landscape architects” and “veterinarians” to the a list that
included “architects” and “doctors”). Others were legally questionable: Adding “claim adjusters
and/or administrators” and “insurance agents and/or brokers” to the list of “professional services”
conflicted with successful court challenges holding similar services nonprofessional.70 And some
appeared to invite corruption: Two new terms, “telecommunications” and “data processing,” opened
a door to discretionary abuses that later led to indictments for Nagin and his chief technology
officer.71
Permissiveness continued two years later in CRN 04-02, which expanded “Exceptions” beyond
“emergency situations” to authorize acquisition of “certain items and services” through federal
supply schedules.72 This change increased Nagin appointees’ discretion to award information
technology contracts and likely contributed to the Nagin administration’s later difficulties with
federal prosecutors.73
CRN 05-01 repealed MHM 96-020 and the two Nagin executive orders but retained their
shortcomings and made the professional services procurement process even weaker:74
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1. By empowering the city attorney to determine “whether a service constitutes a
‘professional service,’” the Nagin executive order expanded the number of contracts
that could be exempted from public bidding wholly at the discretion of a mayoral
appointee.75
2. A meaningless “monitoring” process in subsection 8(H) designated the city attorney
to serve as an “independent” monitor of all non-legal procurements and the CAO to
serve as the “independent” monitor for all legal services procurements—a reciprocal
relationship between mayoral appointees that drained any value or meaning from the
concept of “monitoring.”
3. Most egregiously, subsection 8(I) deemed Selection Review Panel “Deliberations
Confidential” and prohibited panel members “from disclosing the contents of such
discussions and/or deliberations to any third parties,”76 all of which violated the
state’s open meetings law.77
When the city council tried to legislate greater transparency by unanimously approving an ordinance
to require that evaluation committees meet in public, Ray Nagin vetoed it.78
Mayor Nagin and his chief technology officer later faced federal charges arising out of their
manipulation of the professional services contracting process. Nagin’s technology chief entered a
guilty plea and “signed a statement admitting he steered roughly $4 million in no-bid city work” to
a contractor who gave him “more than $860,000 in bribes and kickbacks in return.”79 Nagin went to
trial and was convicted on twenty out of twenty-one counts, including fraud and bribery involving
the award of city contracts.80
Nagin’s successor, Mitch Landrieu, got kudos for improving the city’s contracting process. He
was praised for having evaluation committees meet in public, even though public meetings are
already legally required under Louisiana’s Open Meetings Law: “Nagin’s committees [by contrast]
did not meet in public; when the City Council tried to force them to, Nagin simply stopped using
them.”81
Other persistent problems endured, even as the new administration took over at City Hall. As
under Nagin, evaluation committees consisted wholly of mayoral surrogates: “The acknowledged
weakness in this setup is that all of the committee members owe their jobs to the mayor to one degree
or another.”82 Another problem was the ephemeral nature of procurement reforms: “Like Nagin’s
selection process, Landrieu’s new system is the result of an executive order, and a successor could
undo the reforms with a simple rewrite.”83 Landrieu later proposed and voters approved an
amendment to put three-member selection committees into the charter, but those members were all
still appointed by the mayor from within local government. Landrieu declined to entrust the selection
process “to independent experts from outside City Hall, as was recommended more than a decade
ago.”84
The most disappointing missed opportunity was in failing to unite the bifurcated system that set
separate legislative and executive branch policies for procurement of professional service contracts.
The political moment was propitious: The League of Women Voters of New Orleans had asked
mayor and council candidates during the 2014 campaign, “Will you support a City Charter
proposition that allows citizens to vote on unifying the processes for awarding professional services
contracts, establishing a single procedure that applies citywide to all legislative and executive branch
agencies, boards, and commissions?” Questionnaire responses were publicized in a newspaper
column two months before the newly elected officials took office: “A majority of council members
who take office in May have already pledged to support this Charter reform, and Mayor Mitch
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Landrieu has promised a charter amendment soon.”85 Regrettably, the amendment he put before
voters later that year left this important work unfinished.
The fight for reform in professional services procurement goes on. At the time of the Landrieu
proposals, BGR president Janet Howard identified a further need for improvement: “She would
rather have the new chief procurement officer placed under civil service protection.”86 In a 2014 oped column, I provided my own list of other professional services safeguards that should be embedded
in the charter:
Here’s a good start: Assure OIG scrutiny of procurements from start to finish; hold evaluation
meetings in public; make evaluation forms public; require weighted evaluation criteria;
provide independence in selecting the chief procurement officer; and put independent
technical experts on evaluation committees.87
Still today, we need a Home Rule Charter amendment that unites separate mayor and council
procurement policies in a single citywide process covering all professional services contracts; this
reform is “important because procurement policies approved by both branches of government can’t
be changed thereafter without joint mayor-council approval.”88
The fight for reform remains “a history with multiple chapters written over two decades by
many authors. And the final chapter has not yet been written.”89
Case Study in Procurement Reform
We conclude this analysis of professional services procurement reform with a case study illustrating
the use of “inside” and “outside” legislative strategies.
In the first months of 2011, a city council selection review committee met privately to consider
the award of a professional services contract, claiming an exemption under the Open Meetings Act
for “discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of a person.”90
This long-standing exemption makes sense; sensitive information about people’s private lives ought
not be disclosed without good reason. This same provision does away with secrecy, however, in
requiring that “discussion of the appointment of a person to a public body”91 be held in public, which
makes sense, too: If you want to sit on the City Planning Commission, you should be prepared to
answer probing questions about your fitness for appointment to such an important public body.
The law had no similar requirement that the award of a public contract must be discussed in
public, and this made no sense at all. Serving on a board or commission entails only a modest
expenditure of public funds for per diem, travel, conference fees—“chump change” compared to
potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars expended on a professional services contract. The Public
Law Center drafted legislation to fill this gap, and Rep. Neil Abramson introduced it.92
Students in legislative and administrative advocacy learn about an “inside” game and an
“outside” game in the legislative process. The inside game relies on a capable legislator to manage
a bill quietly through the process. The outside game energizes the public and relies on indirect,
grassroots lobbying to marshal support for the bill among legislators. It is possible to play both the
inside game and the outside game—but only if properly sequenced. The inside game comes first:
You can’t hold a press conference on the steps of the State Capitol on Monday, then ask your
legislator to quietly noodle the bill forward during the remaining days of the week after having made
it a high-profile issue.
Rep. Abramson set HB 449 for a committee hearing early in the session. When opposition
appeared in the form of the Governor’s Executive Counsel, an amendment solved the problem,
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adding some inelegant language that did no damage to the bill’s overall objectives.93 HB 449 came
out of committee with a favorable report and passed the House floor unanimously.
The measure was now surely visible to public officials, and we feared some of them might view
its transparency as inimical to one of their “perquisites” of public office. HB 449 could now be
vulnerable to their inside games and behind-the-scenes machinations. An op-ed column deployed
the outside game to draw public attention to the bill and make it harder for potential saboteurs to
impede its progress:
Open meeting laws prohibit private discussions about appointment to a board or
commission. Does it make sense to permit private discussions about awarding public
contracts?
That’s just wrong. HB 449 would make it right, by prohibiting executive sessions to
discuss awarding a public contract.94
HB 449 passed the Senate on a vote of 37–1, returned to the House, and again passed unanimously,
then was signed by the governor and became law on August 15, 2011.
When the city council’s selection review committee next met in the fall of 2011 to consider the
award of a professional services contract, they met in public.
Ordinances and Statutes Elaborating Powers of the Inspector General
Professional services procurement became the leading edge of charter implementation, because it
could no longer be ignored when the city council moved to renew its consultants’ contracts in
January 1996. Other aspects of ethics reform proved easier to ignore, however, including the Ethics
Review Board (ERB) and the OIG.
The revised charter called for the council to pass an ordinance establishing the ERB within six
months; the council met this goal on June 20, 1996.95 The charter also called for university presidents
to nominate and the mayor to name ERB members within the next six months. The university
presidents each sent three nominees to Mayor Morial, who in turn appointed six of seven ERB
members from those names. Inexplicably, he never named the seventh ERB member, who was to be
a free mayoral selection.96 Consequently, the ERB remained moribund during the remaining six
years of the Morial administration and throughout four years of the first Nagin term.
The winds of Katrina blew through New Orleans in August 2005. In their aftermath, the winds
of political change blew fiercely as well, and ethics reform came back onto the agenda. The OIG
proved a catalyst in precipitating ethics reform, and once again, the implementation of an important
ethics innovation grew directly out of a campaign commitment.
When I met with Shelley Midura, a candidate for the District A city council seat in the 2006
citywide elections, I said, “If you get the Inspector General up and running, you can roll up the
sidewalks and go home! Your legacy will be complete.” She took my comment to heart and
campaigned on a platform of ethics reform.97 Then, when elected, she championed an ordinance with
single-minded determination. On the evening the OIG ordinance was finally approved,98 my wife
and I were at dinner in an adjacent state when I got a call on my cell phone from Shelley. She said,
“Can I roll up the sidewalks and go home now?” But that would have been too soon, because more
important work remained to be done.
The following year, two additional ordinances expanded the OIG’s powers and strengthened its
investigative tools.99 One such tool, subpoena power, needed state legislation to be legally
enforceable in state courts. In February 2008, a coalition of civic groups (including Citizens for 1
Greater New Orleans100 and The Public Law Center101) appeared before the Municipal, Parochial,
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and Cultural Affairs Committee in Baton Rouge to support HB 80102 by Rep. J. P. Morrell. As later
enacted, it granted the following important powers to local ethics entities: designation as a law
enforcement agency with access to criminal justice databases103; power to apply for a protective
order and enforcement of a subpoena104; confidentiality for investigative documents; and authority
to meet in executive session when discussing confidential materials.105 Additional laws passed
during 2010–2012 also proved useful in the legal evolution of local ethics entities—not just in
Orleans but in other Louisiana jurisdictions inspired by New Orleans’ example.106
Troubled Relationship between the Office of Inspector General and the Office of Independent
Police Monitor
In 2008 the city council created the Office of Independent Police Monitor (OIPM) as a division
within the OIG,107 and therein lay a contradiction: Could the police monitor live up to its titular
identity as “independent” while functioning as a “division” of the OIG? Over the next several years,
this structural deficit generated increasing tension between the inspector general and the police
monitor, finally breaking into open warfare by 2015 and threatening to tarnish the public profile of
all three local ethics entities.108
Years earlier, before the OIPM got up and running, an important ethics reform arose
unexpectedly out of the abusive hiring process used for selecting the first short-lived police monitor.
Interim Inspector General Len Odom first announced during July 2009 that he intended to hire Neely
Moody as police monitor with no public input; then he backtracked in the face of withering public
criticism, only to make the same decision to hire Neely Moody just one month later after purportedly
conducting a national search.109 A month after that, both Len Odom and Neely Moody were gone,
after having resigned their positions.110
Six months after this debacle, the city council passed an ordinance to prevent such abuses in the
future, establishing a search committee that consisted of members from the local ethics entities (the
inspector general and the ERB chair); the legislative branch (chair of the council’s Criminal Justice
Committee); the executive branch (the police superintendent and a mayoral designee); and two city
residents appointed by the council’s Criminal Justice Committee. The ordinance required a
nationwide search for the police monitor and called for three finalists to attend at least two
community meetings, where they would answer questions from the public.111 The inspector general
retained authority to hire but only from among three finalists who had been vetted by both branches
of city government, by the local ethics board, and by the public. This process yielded Susan Hutson,
who was hired as the second police monitor in 2010 amid a chorus of approving comments by ERB
chair Kevin Wildes (“She has the right skills for the job”) and Inspector General Ed Quatrevaux
(“She plays in the big leagues”).112
The search procedures worked well, but the structural deficit was unchanged; the OIPM
remained a division within the OIG, a tumor perpetually threatening to metastasize as personal and
institutional frictions intensified among the three local ethics entities. Structural reform emerged as
the best solution—but separating the OIPM and OIG would require a charter amendment, which in
turn required voter approval.113
A Home Rule Charter proposition overwhelmingly approved by 71 percent of voters on
November 8, 2016, authorized three important reforms that (1) separated the OIG and OIPM, (2)
apportioned funding among all three local ethics entities, and (3) required independent external
evaluation of all three local ethics entities.114
A subsequent city council ordinance (approved on a divided 5–2 vote) separated the two offices
but fell considerably short of ideal in its implementation of the charter proposition:
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•
•
•
•

The previous participatory search process for police monitor fell by the wayside, replaced with
“Appointment procedures” that eliminated any role for the public or for the legislative and
executive branches of city government.
Gone was the written assurance of two community meetings at which the public could ask
questions of the three finalists.
Gone as well was any assurance that the search process would even yield multiple finalists; the
public might see only a single applicant left standing.
Finally, the implementing ordinance made no provision for independent external evaluation of
the third local ethics entity, the ERB.115

In the last month before her departure from the council, District A councilmember Susan Guidry
took a partial step toward implementing this last requirement with an ordinance repeating
terminology from the charter: “the ethics review board shall be subject to an independent, external
peer review every three years.”116 With no details about how the evaluator was to be chosen,
however, the measure fell far short of actual “implementation”; even so, it mustered only a bare 4–
3 vote of approval.

Part 3. Conclusion
Seafarers embarking on a journey without benefit of a compass employ a strategy called “pointto-point navigation” to keep themselves on course: Pick out a target and make your way to it, then
pick another landmark and keep leapfrogging forward, stringing together a succession of advances
until the journey is complete.117 The 1994–1995 charter revision process initially charted an
ambitious and far-reaching course, but the actual ethics implementation process has consisted of
incremental, point-to-point gains over an arduous period of years. When blown off course, ethics
advocates have repeatedly had to navigate “course corrections” by setting specific targets and
working to achieve them.
The forty-member Citizens’ Advisory Group saw the ethics component of its “Committee
Recommendations” diminished during an essential but frequently damaging dialogue with elected
officials. First, the “Mayor’s Recommendations” rejected a single, citywide professional services
procurement policy in favor of two separate procedures, one for the executive and another for the
legislative branch. Then, the city council eviscerated powerful provisions to establish an OIG and
removed mandatory funding for the ERB before voting its own version of “Proposed
Amendments” onto the ballot,
In the wake of these troubling changes, ethics advocates set specific targets that have steadily
strengthened the local ethics bodies:
•
•

•

Shelley Midura accepted a short-term goal (“Get the OIG up and running!”), and her work
precipitated the ERB’s first meeting—twelve years after the charter mandated its creation. (So
much for mandates—or at least, mandates without money!)
The city’s first inspector general, Bob Cerasoli, saw a target—enhanced powers for the OIG—
then worked with the legislative coordinator Seung Hong in Shelley Midura’s council office
to draft and secure ordinance improvements in 2007 that revitalized many of the original OIG
provisions in the “Committee Recommendations.”
Half a year later, a coalition of civic groups went to Baton Rouge in successful pursuit of state
legislation that imparted legal force to local ordinance provisions on subpoena power,
confidentiality, and access to criminal justice databases.
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•
•

Civic reformers produced a good outcome by advocating for the OIPM that was created in
2008. But again, remedial work proved necessary—first, by moving the OIPM out of the OIG,
then by directing assured funding annually to each of the three local ethics entities.
The second occupant of the IG’s office (an interim appointee, Len Odom) inadvertently
improved selection procedures for the independent police monitor (IPM): The abusive hiring
process by which he appointed (more accurately, “anointed”) Neely Moody as the initial IPM
motivated the city council to pass a remedial ordinance that guaranteed transparency and public
participation in any future IPM search process. Regrettably, these safeguards were lost in a
later ordinance revision.

Thus, ethics advocates have a new target in this point-to-point navigation process: Pass an
ordinance restoring two opportunities for members of the public to query multiple candidates in
selecting a new inspector general or IPM.
As this newest target illustrates, not all ethics reforms require a frontal assault on corruption.
Some reforms work simply by creating a healthier environment, such as the 2010 ordinance that
insured public participation in hiring the police monitor or HB 449 in 2011, which enhanced public
participation and transparency by bringing public scrutiny to bear on evaluating and awarding
professional services contracts. Transparency is the key to accountability in government. We cannot
hold public officials accountable for conduct we cannot see. Transparency laws lay the essential
groundwork for accountability.
Complicating progress in this point-to-point navigation process are the diverse crew members
who share the journey with us. Some pull one way, some in another direction, but all are acting in
accordance with their own perspectives on the rule of law. How can we better understand the sources
of their very different motivations? What follows is my attempt at a typology, first describing the
four different perspectives (A–D) held by disciples and subversives and by legalistic and
personalized interpreters of the rule of law, then ranking them (E) from best to worst on a rule-oflaw spectrum.
(A) At the top of the heap (and a rara avis indeed) is the committed adherent to rule of law—
the disciple, who values rule-of-law principles unconditionally. Rule-of-law disciples accept the
discipline that rule of law imposes—constraints imposed not only on the conduct of others but also
on their own conduct. Many people profess their commitment to rule-of-law principles as a matter
of belief, but they suffer diminished enthusiasm when rule of law imposes limitations on their own
conduct.118
(B) For example, a legalistic interpreter of rule of law could choose not to read the law liberally
to accomplish the purposes for which the law was enacted—or could instead choose to apply a
narrow reading, maximizing personal discretion while maintaining a plausible legal defense of
compliance. Lawyers frequently adopt this posture in the service of their clients’ interests, and who
can deny the legitimacy of this approach when lawyers are acting in a representative capacity? We
should view matters differently, however, when a lawyer is acting not in the service of clients but in
the lawyer’s own interest. This legal, analytical frame is seldom applied to broaden and strengthen
the rule of law. It’s more often deployed to curb and undermine the robust expression of rule-of-law
principles.
This legalistic attitude is certainly not restricted exclusively to lawyers. It’s a common mindset
embraced by many a common man or woman: “Let me get as close to the line as I can get without
going over—or at least not too far over.” With this sentiment, we’ve left behind the domain of the
rule-of-law disciple; we’ve entered a realm of rule-of-law constriction—or worse, rule-of-law
subversion.
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(C) Rule of law subversives need not be engaged in corruption or outright criminality. Subtler and
more insidious is their subversive assault on safeguards that protect the rule of law—safeguards such
as the transparency in open meetings and public records acts; the distribution of power in a checksand-balances political system; the accountability and conflict avoidance served by financial
disclosure and campaign finance laws; and a preference for independent expertise over political
influence in a well-crafted system for awarding professional services contracts.
We often refer to rule-of-law systems. The concept of a system is inextricably linked with ruleof-law principles. I once wrote in a similar context, “Ethics reform does not mean that people start
behaving better. Ethics reform means that systems are put in place to deal with people who are
behaving badly.”119
Respect for the rule of law requires respect for systems that protect the rule of law. The 1980s
mantra about nuclear disarmament is pertinent: “Trust but verify.” We might trust a person while
nonetheless championing systems to document that person’s compliance with the law—that person,
and everyone else who holds public office.
Systems both verify good conduct and encourage it. Erode the system, and erosion of the law
follows closely behind. Some public officials govern as if no one will ever follow them in office.
They seek relentlessly to dismantle or undermine systems that limit their ability to maximize
discretion; they single-mindedly accrete power unto themselves during their brief term in office.
They give no thought to how dismantling systemic safeguards might enable their successors in office
to use these enhanced prerogatives abusively, adversely impacting the public interest. These
dismantlers of systemic protections are accurately and aptly described as rule of law subversives.
So rarely does a dismantled system get put back together again that Lt. Governor Billy
Nungesser made headlines in 2019 when he announced his intention to reverse legislative changes
muscled through by his predecessor, Mitch Landrieu. Before Landrieu’s legislation, “the state’s No.
2 official could appoint only three members” of the Louisiana State Museum Board; the 2008 law
“transformed a 21-member board . . . into a group chosen solely by Landrieu, with some input from
the various groups that support the museum’s mission.” The new law had a predictably disastrous
effect on stable administration of the museum: “in the 11 years the law has been on the books, the
museum system has had seven different directors, sparking criticism that politicizing the job has
made it difficult to find and retain qualified candidates.” Nungesser’s decision to reverse this policy
“heartened members of the Louisiana Museum Foundation, who ‘erupted in applause.’” Foundation
president Melissa Steiner said, “It is a rare day indeed that we hear of an elected official giving up
this kind of control, and we could not be more pleased.”120
(D) Systems exist to punish bad behavior, and here, perhaps, the appropriate image is Lady
Justice, blindfolded. Rule of law in this context means a willingness to administer rules and dispense
outcomes without regard to personal considerations. We put the blindfold on Lady Justice because
we don’t want her to see and be influenced by whoever stands before her. Some people find it hard
to resist a personalized rule-of-law perspective, surrendering an impartial commitment to rule-oflaw principles for what they may think are the most benevolent of reasons: “We know this person!”
To give this rule-of-law principle of impartiality its most appropriate and broadest application,
we need to lift it out of the adjudicatory context that may be implied by the Lady Justice metaphor.
Judges are expected to be impartial arbiters of legal disputes, but the same expectation of impartial
judgment should apply to government officials who administer their duties in an executive or
legislative office rather than in a courtroom. A public official’s use of discretion to fix a traffic
ticket—or to “fix” the procurement process in favor of a preferred contractor—would be judged an
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abuse of public office in some jurisdictions, even if neither action quite involved an exchange of
money or constituted a criminal quid-pro-quo bribe.
This principle of blindness toward the parties should also guide civic sector advocates and
members of the press, who might otherwise rely on their personal preferences and apply a double
standard when evaluating procedures that govern people in public office. In evaluating policies for
the procurement of professional services, for example, it’s not in the public interest to say, “Oh, we
know this person is trustworthy and will administer these new procedures fairly.” In today’s fractured
and fractious society, we needn’t travel far to find someone else who would say of the same person,
“Oh, that untrustworthy excuse for a public servant! Those new procedures better be foolproof!”
People are not policies and procedures. People change; policies and procedures endure—at least
until they change through democratic, transparent procedures. We might trust certain people, but we
should be blind to people when evaluating procedures: “Trust but verify.” Systems and procedures
supply the essential, verifying half of this mantra.
Do we go too far in suggesting that this duty of blind impartiality should also govern the conduct
of private parties, such as civic sector advocates and members of the press? No, because these
“private” players exercise important “public” influence. The BGR speaks with authority to its
members and to the civic community. A newspaper columnist enjoys a privileged platform from
which to tell a credible story to readers. Where and when these influencers of public opinion choose
to invest their beliefs, so too do many others. These private parties should not “play favorites” when
dispensing their wisdom. Comments on a policy for procurement of professional services should be
based on an assessment of the policy, not the policy maker who promulgated it. Take that favored
person out of the chair and drop in your worst nightmare of a public official: Does the policy
withstand this test?
(E) How should we rank this diverse spectrum of actors who intersect with ethics and the rule
of law? Disciples occupy one end of the spectrum. Subversives anchor the other end; their lack of
respect for the systems that sustain rule of law constitutes an existential threat. Others, who
personalize the rule of law or who subject it to a legalistic frame, inhabit the middle; their actions
have a compromising but not a cataclysmic effect on the integrity and strength of rule of law.
Which is more important: good people or good laws? Truthfully, we shouldn’t have to choose
one over the other, and in fact, the two tend to go together. Good people in public office often produce
good laws and should be expected to administer these laws fairly. When the occasional bad actor
enters the room, however, we need to have done all we can to impose rigor and transparency under
the rule of law. Ethics rules, transparency laws, procedural safeguards—all are compatible with the
administration of government by good people. But when the need arises, they also serve as
indispensable checks on abuse by bad actors.121
“Rule of law” means that everyone—the government and governmental officials included—
obeys the law. Good people in government, bad people in government, all people in government
must be equally bound to and judged by their compliance with the rule of law. Until this principle is
uniformly embraced, ethics reform work must continue.
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